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POSTSCRIPTS
Canon Law and Wills
In the last issue, The Catholic Lawyer
reprinted an article by Father Charles Con-
nors entitled "Canon Law and Wills."' This
brief but interesting discussion purported
to set down some of the practical consid-
erations of which the conscientious lawyer
should be aware in order to fulfill his cli-
ent's intent. One such practical considera-
tion pointed out by the author was the
possible differences in the tax consequences
of bequests to "religious."
In a recent case2 decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the possibility of differing tax con-
sequences alluded to by Father Connors
was put into sharp focus. Section 812(d)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
(now section 2055) states that bequests
"to or for the use of" a religious institution
are not includible in the taxable estate. The
testatrix in this Second Circuit case exe-
cuted her will in 1941, making her son, a
scholastic in the Society of Jesus, a bene-
ficiary. In 1950, two days before the son
was to take his solemn vows of poverty,
chastity and obedience, he executed a writ-
ten renunciation of all his property rights,
disposing of all properties and rights,
known or unknown, in favor of the Society.
The renunciation took effect after his sol-
emn vows, and was a contract enforceable
at law.8 The testatrix learned of her son's
17 CATHOLIC LAWYER 308 (1961).
2Cox v. Commissioner (U.S. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
Dec. 5, 1961), 147 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 1962, p. 1,
col. 1.
3 Burt v. Oneida Community, Ltd., 137 N.Y. 346,
33 N.E. 307 (1892). See also St. Benedict Order
v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640 (1914).
solemn vows in 1953 and wrote her attor-
ney as follows:
Lewis has been supported by the Jesuit
Order for 18 years, so naturally I would like
to remember him more than Frank, Jr., or
Bing, not that he will be able to keep it for
himself, but will be only too happy to pass
it on to the order .... 4
Upon the death of the testatrix in 1954
the executors sought to qualify the bequest
as one "to or for the use of" the Society of
Jesus, and thereby reduce the estate taxes.
They made two arguments: first, that the
bequest was to the Society, and second,
that the son was a constructive trustee for
the Society. As to the first contention the
Court stated that the testatrix's subsequent
knowledge of her son's vows did not alter
the fact that her bequest was to him, not
the Society. And, as to his being a con-
structive trustee, the Court held there was
no basis for such a claim:
There is no evidence whatever that Lewis
induced such a bequest by word or deed.
The bequest was made not because of any
representation to the testatrix that it would
go to the society .... It was Lewis' renuncia-
tion and assignment which was to be the
operative dispositive act-as the testatrix
plainly recognized. She did not, as she read-
ily might have done, by her will, create any
interest of any kind, equitable or legal, con-
ditional or executory in the society.5
Under canon law the son could not acquire
property after his solemn vows. Testatrix
was apparently generally aware of his ina-
4 Cox v. Commissioner, supra notc 2.
5 Id. at col. 2 (emphasis added).
bility to keep the property. Nevertheless,
as far as the courts are concerned it was
his renunciation, viewed as a contract,
which transferred the property from him to
the Society; the contract, not the canon law
was given effect. In the words of Father
Connors, "regrettable situations have re-
sulted from conformance with canon law
exclusively, while ignoring civil law.""
State Efforts to Combat Obscenity
It is hardly necessary to reiterate here
the very difficult problems faced by any
state in its efforts to halt the increasing
influx of obscene publications onto local
newsstands.' The constitutional safeguards
of individual rights, although most desira-
ble from the point of view of freedom of
thought and expression, have nonetheless
greatly reduced the number of weapons in
the state arsenals available to combat this
enemy of society. In times less sensitive to
individual freedoms, the ingenuity and even
the patience of the various state legislatures
was not so heavily, nor so often, taxed with
such little ultimate success. Nevertheless,
the problem remains and fortunately the
various states and even private citizens con-
tinue to expend their energies in serious
efforts to cope with it within constitutional
limits.
One such effort by the Legislature of
Rhode Isiand was recently subjected to
constitutional attack in that state's high
court, and survived it.2 The Legislature had
6 Connors, Canon Law and Wills, 7 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 308, 309 (1961).
1 See generally, St. John-Stevas, Obscenity, Liter-
ature and the Law, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 301
(1957); Sheerin, Censorship in Contemporary So-
ciety, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 292 (1957); Tobin,
State and Federal Censorship, 3 CATHOLIC LAW-
YER 312 (1957).
2 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, - R.I. -, 176
A.2d 393 (1961).
8 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1962
created the Rhode Island Commission to
Encourage Morality in Youth and charged
its members by Resolution No. 73 as
follows:
It shall be the duty of said commission to
educate the public concerning any book,
picture, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper or
other thing containing obscene, indecent or
impure language, as defined in chapter 11-31
of the general laws . . . and to investigate
and recommend the prosecution of all vio-
lations of said sections ....
In exercising their legislative mandate, the
Commission members compiled lists of
publications which they felt were "com-
pletely objectionable for sale, distribution
or display for youths under eighteen
years."4 They sought to gain the coopera-
tion of local distributors by voluntary re-
moval of the objectionable items, stating
that receipt of such cooperation would bar
the necessity of their recommending prose-
cutions to the attorney general. Various
distributors complied with these sugges-
tions, and returned their supplies of paper-
bound books on the list to the publishers.
Two publishers attacked Resolution No.
73 as an unconstitutional infringement of
their first amendment freedom of the press,
and further alleged that as construed by
the Commission the resolution was uncon-
stitutionally applied. In what was perhaps
a refreshing change of pace in this area,
the Court found "no difficulty in declaring
the resolution constitutional." 5 The Court
analyzed Resolution No. 73 in the follow-
ing words:
On its face it does not authorize previous
restraint of freedom of the press. . . . The
functions conferred are solely educative and
3 Id. at -, 176 A.2d at 394-95.
4 Id. at -,176 A.2d at 395.
5 Ibid.
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investigative in aid of the legislAtive policy
to prevent the dissemination of obscene and
impure literature, especially as it affects the
morality of youth.6
The Court very carefully pointed out that
a distributor might with impunity refuse to
respond to any Commission suggestions,
and also that the Commission could rec-
ommend prosecution but could not order it.
In handling the alleged unconstitutional
application of the resolution by the Com-
mission, the Court overruled this objection
on the ground that the Commission did no
more than seek and receive the voluntary
cooperation of the distributors. It stated
that
it is no justification for petitioners to argue
as they do that because the local distributor
will not want to oppose the commission such
a practice has the inevitable result of sup-
pression of their books by censorship.
7
A dissenting opinion concurred with the
majority insofar as it found the resolution
constitutional, but disagreed as to the ac-
tions of the Commission. It was the view
of the dissent that the Commission had
construed its authority to include the pre-
vention of the sale or distribution of pub-
lications deemed objectionable, and had
acted on this premise. The dissent con-
cluded, not that the Commission's actions
were unconstitutional, but more simply,
that it had exceeded its authority. Thus,
quite easily, the dissent decided it was not
necessary to pass upon the constitutionality
of the Commission's actions.
Resolution No. 73 was held to be free
of constitutional objection. Perhaps, the
only difficulty with this type of legislation
is the efficiency with which it can be car-
ried out in the face of constitutional re-
6 Ibid.
7 Id. at -, 176 A.2d at 397.
strictions. In this particular, majority and
dissent differed, but even here constitu-
tional problems were quite cleverly avoided
by the approach of the dissent.
State Aid to Private Schools
Many states have had to resolve the
problem of whether their respective con-
stitutions permitted them to pass legislation
providing bus transportation, textbooks or
lunches for students in nonpublic schools.'
When finally presented to the particular
state's high court for a constitutional de-
termination, as such legislation generally is,
the results have differed. The reasons for
this difference in conclusions at times lie
in the specific wording of the state consti-
tution involved, but, more often, the ques-
tion seems to turn on the attitude of the
state court toward the "child-benefit" the-
ory, the most consistent argument raised
to support such legislation.
Recently, the Assistant Superintendent
for Pupil Personnel and Special Education
Services of Tulsa requested an opinion in-
volving a ramification of this constitutional
problem from its attorney. It is to be noted
that the opinion in no way represented a
court adjudication; it was advisory in na-
ture. Specifically, the assistant superin-
tendent wished to know the responsibility,
if any, of the Tulsa public schools for pro-
viding special services, such as those of
the reading clinic, the tests and measure-
ments department or speech therapy, to
children who live within the school district
but who are enrolled in nonpublic schools.
It was the opinion of the school district's
attorney2 "that the Tulsa School District
1 See Reed, The School Bus Challenge, 5 CATHO-
LIC LAWYER 99 (1959); see also 6 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 323 (1960).
2 Since the opinion was of an advisory nature and
involved no court adjudication, it has not, to the
[had] no obligation to provide special serv-
ices to any child who [was] not enrolled
in the Tulsa Public Schools." He was
"further of the opinion that the school
district [was] prohibited from furnishing
such services to those children who have
elected to attend a parochial school rather
than public schools." The basis for this
latter conclusion was a decision of the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma invol ving bus
transportation legislation,3 and an advisory
opinion of the State Attorney General to
the State Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion concerning the availability of the Na-
tional School Lunch Program to parochial
school students.
The Oklahoma constitution, Article 2,
Section 5 provides:
No public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, donated, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomina-
tion, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dig-
nitary, or sectarian institution as such.
The Oklahoma legislature passed a bus
transportation bill in 1939, making such
transportation available to children attend-
ing nonpublic schools along or near the
transportation route to the public schools.
In Gurney v. Ferguson,3 the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma held the statute unconstitu-
tional. The argument made in defense of
the statute was that it benefited the chil-
dren, not the schools. Terming this argu-
ment "not impressive" the Court stated:
knowledge of the Editors, been published in any
source of general circulation. The Catholic Lawyer
gratefully acknowledges the kindness of Mr. C. H.
Rosenstein, Attorney for the Independent School
District No. I of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, in
providing this publication with information con-
cerning the basis for his opinion.
3 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941).
8 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1962
It is true that this use of public money and
property aids the child, but it is no less true
that practically every proper expenditure
for school purposes aids the child. We are
convinced that this expenditure, in its broad
and true sense, and as commonly under-
stood, is an expenditure in furtherance of
the constitutional duty or function of main-
taining schools as organizations or institu-
tions. The state has not authority to maintain
a sectarian school....
If the cost of the school bus and the main-
tenance and operation thereof was not in
aid of the public schools, the expenditure
therefor out of the school funds would be
unauthorized and illegal. Yet we assume it
is now acquiesced in by all that such ex-
penditures are properly in aid of the public
schools and are authorized and legal ex-
penditures. . . . [I]t would seem necessarily
to follow that when pupils of a parochial
school are transported that such service
would likewise be in aid of that school.4
The opinion of the Attorney General
was in response to a question posed by the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
The latter official asked whether public
school cafeterias operated under the Na-
tional School Lunch Program could be
opened to parochial school students in the
district, on the theory that their release at
noon from the parochial schools placed
them under public school supervision on
the lunch hour. The Attorney General in
his opinion stated that the Gurney prin-
ciple would seem to preclude such a pro-
gram. On the basis of these events, the
attorney for the Tulsa School District was
of the opinion that special services were
equally unavailable to nonpublic school
students.
Certainly, the Gurney case seemed to
lay to rest the "child-benefit" theory in
Oklahoma. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
see how a reading clinic or speech therapy
4 Id. at -, 122 P.2d at 1003-04.
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for parochial school children can endanger
the principle of separation of church and
state in that state. So long as school funds
are used to finance such special services,
the Gurney argument to the effect that
school funds must be used for the support
of schools would be available to defeat a
"child-benefit" approach. The same result
might equally be predicated if general
funds were used, under the Oklahoma con-
stitution. However, were general public
funds appropriated for this purpose, it
would seem possible to contend that such
legislation was in fact in aid of the child
and sustainable as a general welfare meas-
ure. The benefit to the private school, in
such a case, would appear to be most inci-
dental to the interests of the child, which
the state may properly protect. It would be
a torturous piece of reasoning that would
place a parent in the position of having to
sacrifice his natural right to select his
child's training in order to guarantee the
child the benefits of speech therapy.
